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In Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC (“Adeyeye”), an 
employer denied an employee’s request for a five-week leave of 
absence for the employee to participate in his father’s funeral 
ceremonies in Nigeria.
1
 This case exemplified the potential conflicts 
surrounding religious accommodation in the workplace. Under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), an employer must reasonably 
accommodate an employee’s request regarding a religious practice or 
observance, as long as that request does not impose an undue hardship 
on the employer.
2
 Courts look to previous Title VII jurisprudence and 
commentary to evaluate an employer’s obligation to accommodate an 
employee’s request for a leave of absence rooted in that employee’s 
religious practices or observances. In Adeyeye, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; B.A., Philosophy & Religion, Colgate University. I 
would like to thank Professor Hal Morris, our Executive Editor Kathleen 
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1
 Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013). 
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000). 
1
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Court of Appeals found that Heartland Sweeteners, LLC (“Heartland”) 
improperly rejected Sikiru Adyeye’s request for religious 
accommodation. The court’s decision epitomizes federal courts’ 
broader interpretation of both the qualifications of a religious tradition 
and an employer’s accommodation of religious traditions in the work 
place.  
As federal courts implement a more tolerant approach to 
employees’ religious observances those courts simultaneously 
promulgate the general expansion and promotion of religious freedom 
in the workplace. This trend towards more religious accommodation is 
exemplified in the amendments to Title VII, the Guidelines of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), federal case 
law, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Adeyeye. 
Federal courts’ purposeful development towards employers’ broader 
accommodation of employees’ religious traditions has appropriately 
influenced a greater acceptance and understanding of a diverse variety 
of religions in the work place. Importantly, courts’ tolerant and 
progressive approach towards religious accommodation is consonant 
with the freedom of religion principles established in the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The “reluctance to 
require more than a de minimis accommodation by employers seems 
to be inapposite to the societal goal of allowing members of all 
religions to practice their faith freely.”
3
 For employees to experience 
the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, employers must 
reasonably accommodate those employees’ religious practices and 
observances.  
Title VII’s requirement that employers provide reasonable 
religious accommodations is closely intertwined with the freedom of 
religion under the First Amendment. The First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution states “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
                                                 
3
 Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has 
Failed to Provide Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious 
Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 554 (2010). 
2
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 Freedom of religion is applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section 1, 
which states “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
5
 Enforcing employers to 
comply with employees’ reasonable religious requests encourages 
religious freedom in the workplace. Title VII compels employers to 
reasonably accommodate employees’ religious requests while the First 
Amendment simultaneously supports individuals’ rights to practice 
and observe their religious traditions.
6
 While the Constitution protects 
individuals from government intrusion into their respective religious 
traditions, Title VII protects employees from religious discrimination 
in the work place.
7
 
Under Title VII, following an employee’s request for religious 
accommodation, “the employer can avoid liability by showing either 
that it reasonably accommodated the employee’s observance or 
practice, or that accommodation of the observance or practice would 
result in an undue hardship for the employer.”
8
 If an employer engages 
in conduct prohibited by Title VII—for example, by refusing to 
provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee’s religious 
request—a mistreated employee may pursue a cause of action against 
the employer.
9
 If the requested accommodation would cause the 
employer an undue hardship, the accommodation would not be 
                                                 
4
 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
5
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. 
6
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000); U.S. Const. amend. I. 
7
 JOHN JUDE MORAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: NEW CHALLENGES IN THE 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 355 (1997). 
8
 Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in 
the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
363, 367-68 (2005). 
9
 VERN E. HAUCK, ARBITRATING RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL 
ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION GRIEVANCES 12 (1997). 
3
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required under Title VII.
10
 Questions regarding the sufficiency of an 
employer’s religious accommodation or showing of undue hardship 
often arise when an employee requests days off of work, perhaps due 
to a weekly Sabbath observance, or as in Adeyeye, a one-off religious 
ceremony.
11
 Whether a request for a religious accommodation is a 
single or regularly scheduled occurrence, an employer’s denial of that 
request may discriminate against the employee if the employer cannot 




II. INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION FROM TITLE VII 
TO ADEYEYE 
 
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964   
 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Act”) in 
response to discrimination against racial minorities in the United 
States.
13
 Though prompted by racial inequality in the United States, 
the Act addressed discrimination based on race, religion, gender or 
national origin.
14
 In Title VII of the Act, legislators implemented 
statutory standards and protections to prevent discrimination of 
employees by employers.
15
 Title VII stated that “[i]t shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to … discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
                                                 
10
 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2000). 
11
 Page, supra note 8, at 367-68 (citing EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 
F.2d 1504, 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
12
 See generally Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
13
 H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 
2393, 1963 WL 4735, at *3-4; Blair, supra note 3, at 521; Debbie N. 
Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent 
Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 580 (2000). 
14
 Blair, supra note 3, at 521; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2006). 
15
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17; Blair, supra note 3, at 521; see 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2006). 
4
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respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”
16
 Under Title VII, if an employee requests a change 
in his or her work schedule to accommodate a religious observance or 
practice, the employer must provide a reasonable accommodation in 
response to that employee’s request, as long as that employee’s change 





1. The Purpose of Title VII 
 
Title VII was “the first comprehensive federal employment 
discrimination legislation that prohibited employment discrimination 
because of, inter alia, an individual’s religion.”
18
 Title VII defined the 
term “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief.”
19
 The Seventh Circuit applied this 
comprehensive definition when analyzing an employee’s request for 
religious accommodation in Adeyeye. Nevertheless, an employee’s 
request for religious accommodation is limited by Title VII, which 
maintains that an employer is not obligated to fulfill an employee’s 
request for religious accommodation if that “employer demonstrates 
                                                 
16
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). 
17
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
18
 Bryan M. Likins, Determining the Appropriate Definition of Religion 
and Obligation to Accommodate the Religious Employee Under Title VII: A 
Comparison of Religious Discrimination Protection in the United States and 
United Kingdom, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 114-15 (2011); see 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1991); 
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that “Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against 
employees and job applicants based on their religion”); Smith v. N. Am. 
Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Okla. 1970) (indicating that the 
Act is “generally heralded as the first effort by the United States Government 
to outlaw discrimination in private employment on the basis of race, religion, 
national origin, and sex”). 
19
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
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that he [or she] is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s 
… religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the 




2. The Impact and Results of Title VII 
 
After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law, courts 
consequently recognized a significant disparity between Title VII’s 
prohibition of religious discrimination in the work place and any 
positive requirement for an employer to accommodate an employee’s 
religious practices or observances.
21
 For example, “the Sixth Circuit 
interpreted religious discrimination in employment to require merely 
treating employees the same without regard to religion.”
22
 The court 
found that where an employer’s scheduling requirement “was 
generally applicable to all employees regardless of the employees’ 
religious beliefs, it did not discriminate against any employee’s 
religion.”
23
 While the original text of Title VII did not clearly place an 
affirmative duty on employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ 
religious requests, further analysis has shown that the legislators, in 
drafting Title VII, intended for Title VII to place an affirmative duty 
on employers to accommodate employees’ religious requests.
24
  
Instead, courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, found that rather than 
establishing any affirmative duty, Title VII imposed “a negative duty 
of not discriminating against employees based on religion.”
25
 That 




 Kaminer, supra note 13, at 580; see, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals 
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d mem. by an equally divided court, 
402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 
(M.D. Fla. 1971), rev’d, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
22
 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by 
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Steven D. Jamar, 
Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and 
Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 741 (1996). 
23
 Dewey, 429 F.2d at 330; Steven D. Jamar, supra note 22, at 741.  
24
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negative duty interpretation held that where an employer provided a 
religious accommodation for an employee, that employer “would be 
discriminating in favor of that employee,” an act that “was deemed to 
be just as prohibited as [the initial] discrimination against an 
employee.”
26
 The negative duty interpretations of Title VII, where 
courts analyzed the Act in opposition to the drafters’ intentions, 
spurred appropriate responses via the EEOC Guidelines and the 1972 
amendments to the Act. Prior to these 1972 amendments, “some 
employers took the position that they had to apply work rules 
uniformly in order to avoid allegations of religious favoritism, in spite 
of the fact that such uniform enforcement frequently had an uneven 




B. Religious Observances and Practices Interpreted in Relation to 
Conscientious Objectors in United States v. Seeger, (1965) 
 
Federal courts’ first major analysis of religious accommodation 
following Title VII’s enactment came from litigation surrounding 
conscientious objection to the military draft. Much like the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis of Nigerian religious traditions in Adeyeye, the 
courts sought a broader understanding of what constitutes a religion in 
order to appropriately analyze the litigants’ claims under Title VII. The 
Supreme Court, in interpreting religious and non-religious 
conscientious objectors to the military draft in United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 
broadened the characterization of “religious practices to include moral 




 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious 
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. FED. 580 (1975). 
7
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or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely 
held with the strength of traditional religious views.”
28
 
In Adeyeye, the Seventh Circuit found that “United States v. 
Seeger provides a helpful definition of religion: The test ‘is whether a 
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life 
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.’”
29
 
The EEOC stated that “[i]n interpreting what qualifies as religion 
under the broad statutory definition of Title VII, we have endorsed this 
standard that was used in Seeger to interpret the federal statute 
exempting conscientious religious objectors from military 
conscription, finding that the definition serves equally well for the 
purposes of Title VII.”
30
 The Adeyeye court further adhered to the 
Seeger court’s interpretation of sincerely held religious beliefs, finding 
that “[i]n such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the 
registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be 
given great weight. … The validity of what he believes cannot be 
questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be 
tempted to question the existence of the registrant’s ‘Supreme Being’ 




In Seeger, the Court addressed Congress’s interpretation of 
religious beliefs with respect to the conscientious objector statute, 
finding that “Congress, in using the expression ‘Supreme Being’ rather 
than the designation ‘God,’ was merely clarifying the meaning of 
                                                 
28
 Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty to 
Accommodate Employee Religious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia 
Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 515 (1989). 
29
 Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 
2013) (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). 
30
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (emphasis added); see Redmond v. GAF 
Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n. 12 (7th Cir.1978) (explaining that a religious 
belief is a belief that is considered religious “in [the] person’s own scheme of 
things” and is “sincerely held”). 
31
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (citing Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184 (reviewing 
criminal convictions for men claiming conscientious objections to military 
conscription)). 
8
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religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to 
exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.”
32
 
The Court in Seeger analyzed a sincere and meaningful belief as 
whether that belief “occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel 
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”
33
 This analysis represents 
a transition to the federal courts’ broader understanding of religious 
traditions and sincerely held religious beliefs. In Seeger, the court 
found that having “a conviction based upon religious training and 
belief” includes “all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a 
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or 
upon which all else is ultimately dependent.”
34
 
In defining sincere religious belief, the Supreme Court in Seeger 
avoided “imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious 
beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with 
the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those 
whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.”
35
 
This all-encompassing construction of sincere religious beliefs 
supports the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Adeyeye regarding Adeyeye’s 
sincere and simultaneous beliefs in both Nigerian and Christian 
religious traditions. 
 
C. The 1966 EEOC Guidelines Regarding Religious Accommodation 
in Response to Title VII: “Serious Inconvenience” 
 
The 1966 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Guidelines addressed an employer’s duty to accommodate an 
employee’s request for religious accommodation.
36
 In 1966, shortly 
                                                 
32
 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965). 
33
 Id. at 165-66. 
34




 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (The EEOC is “composed of five members, 
not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party. 
Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of five years.” The EEOC 
9
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after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC “issued a guideline 
stating that, under the Act, employers had an obligation to 
accommodate the religious needs of their employees when 
accommodation could be achieved without serious inconvenience to 
the conduct of their business.”
37
 These Guidelines first addressed the 
duty imposed on an employer to “reasonably accommodate an 
employee’s request for a change in schedule or use of vacation or 




The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion stated that 
similar to an affirmative obligation, “the duty not to discriminate on 
religious grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to 
accommodate the reasonable religious needs of employees and, in 
some cases, prospective employees where such accommodation can be 
made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.”
39
 
This “serious inconvenience” standard played a significant role in 
courts’ analysis of religious accommodation in the work place. The 
term “serious inconvenience” set a relatively low bar for the employer 
to hurdle in order to successfully deny the employee’s request for 
religious accommodation without discriminating against that employee 
due to the employee’s religion. The general understanding of what 
constitutes a serious inconvenience, as opposed to an undue hardship, 
                                                                                                                   
Guidelines do not hold precedential authority over the decisions of the 
Supreme Court or federal courts. However, those Guidelines do impose 
persuasive authority on judicial decision-making and legislative 
amendments. The purpose of the Guidelines is to advise legislators, courts 
and litigants as a statement of policy. Legislators have applied some of the 
standards and parameters set in the EEOC Guidelines to the amendments of 
Title VII.). 
37
 Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 514. 
38
 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 
1605.1 (1967) (codifying the 1966 Guidelines). 
39
 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967); see Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 
1090-91 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 
1293 (1988) (emphasis added). 
10
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further illustrates the relative ease with which an employer may 
demonstrate a relatively minor hindrance related to an employee’s 
religious request, and consequently deny that employee’s otherwise 
reasonable and justifiable claim of religious accommodation under 
Title VII. 
In addition to analyzing religious accommodation, the EEOC fine-
tuned these Guidelines as employers and courts evaluated “whether or 
not a practice or belief is religious.”
40
 In so doing, the EEOC 
Guidelines responded to employers’ and courts’ failure to recognize 
the variety of religious observances and practices for which employees 
seek accommodation. Finding that “Title VII’s definition of ‘religion’ 
[was] deficient, the EEOC, charged with administering Title VII, … 
formulated its own definition of religion.”
41
 “[T]he Commission … 
define[d] religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to 
what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of 
traditional religious views.”
42
 The EEOC essentially borrowed and 
applied the Supreme Court’s analysis of the religiousness and sincerity 
of requests for accommodation that stemmed from the Courts’ 
conscientious objector decisions.
43
 In applying the EEOC’s definition 
of religious practices in Adeyeye, where the employee identified with 
both Nigerian and Christian religious traditions, the Seventh Circuit 
rightfully applied a comprehensive understanding of the employee’s 




                                                 
40
 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; 45 FR 72612, Oct. 31, 1980, unless otherwise 
noted; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq. 
41
 Page, supra note 8, at 369.  
42
 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; 45 FR 72612, Oct. 31, 1980, unless otherwise 
noted; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq. 
43
 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
44
 “The fact that no religious group espouses [an employee’s particular 
claimed] beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual 
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether 
11
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D. 1967 Amendments to the 1966 EEOC Guidelines: “Undue 
Hardship” 
 
In the 1966 EEOC Guidelines, the first Guidelines the EEOC 
released regarding religious accommodation in the workplace, an 
employer was required to show that the religious accommodation 
would present a “serious inconvenience.”
45
 The 1966 EEOC 
Guidelines were amended in 1967, shortly after their release, and 
“require[d] employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ 
religious needs short of undue hardship on the employer’s business.”
46
 
The amended Guidelines stated that “the employer [has an affirmative 
duty] to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of 
employees and prospective employees where such accommodations 
can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”
47
 This change in the EEOC Guidelines’ language from 
“serious inconvenience” to “undue hardship,” had a significant impact 
on courts’ understanding of religious accommodation under Title VII.  
Specifically, these modifications addressed the necessary 
conditions that permit an employer to deny an employee’s request for 
                                                                                                                   
the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee.” 29 
C.F.R. § 1605.1; 45 FR 72612, Oct. 31, 1980, unless otherwise noted; Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the 
phrase “religious practice” as used in these Guidelines includes both 
religious observances and practices, as stated in Section 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 
2000e(j).  
45
 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968) (codifying the 1967 Guidelines). 
46
 29 CFR § 1605.1(b) (1968); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977), 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1700-01; Reed 
Sussman, An Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Its Employees’ Religious 
Beliefs Under Title VII: Cook v. Chrysler Corporation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 532 
(1994). 
47
 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 
1605.1(b) (1968); see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 
(1977); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1091 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1293 (1988) (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
12
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a religious accommodation. This change in language essentially 
transformed the duty of the employer from a neutral duty, to an 
affirmative one.
48
 The improved text of the 1967 Guidelines made 
“clear that the Commission believed, contrary to its earlier view, that 
in certain instances employers would be required to excuse employees 




E. Conscientious Objectors Revisited in Welsh v. United States, (1970) 
 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its analysis of sincere religious 
belief from Seeger in Welsh v. United States. Welsh, like Seeger, 
addressed a conscientious objector’s sincerely held religious beliefs. In 
Welsh, the Court reversed the lower court’s decision and ruling due to 
“its fundamental inconsistency with United States v. Seeger.”
50
 The 
Welsh Court, much like the Seeger Court, presented a broad 
understanding of what may constitute a sincere religious belief.  
The Welsh Court found that whether the draft registrant 
specifically referred to his or her belief as “religious” was “highly 
unreliable” to the government agency or judicial fact finder that 
ultimately determined whether the claim at issue was based on that 
registrant’s sincerely held religious belief.
51
 This analysis was 
analogous to the facts presented in Adeyeye. In Adeyeye, as described 
in further detail below, the employee’s written requests for a leave of 
absence did not explicitly state that his requirement to participate in 
his father’s funeral ceremony was a religious obligation. However, in 
congruence with the Supreme Court’s holding in Welsh, the Seventh 
Circuit did not hold that the absence of any explicit reference to 
                                                 
48
 Kaminer, supra note 13, at 581. 
49
 Id. at 581-82 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 
86 n.1 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
50
 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (citing United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 396 U.S. 816 
(1969)). 
51
 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341. 
13
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religion in Adeyeye’s written requests would bar him from receiving a 
reasonable accommodation. 
As with employees requesting a religious accommodation, with 
respect to conscientious objectors, “very few registrants [we]re fully 
aware of the broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in [the 
applicable and pertinent statute], and accordingly a registrant’s 
statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide 
for those charged with administering the exemption.”
52
 The Welsh 
Court highlighted the potential for a draft registrant or employee’s lack 
of familiarity with the standards regarding the sincerity of religious 
beliefs. In doing so, the Court emphasized the need for a broad 
understanding of religion with respect to the exact language expressed 
in a conscientious objection to military service or a request for 
religious accommodation in the workplace. A finder of fact must be 
open to a broad conceptualization of religion to properly analyze 
whether a request is sincerely based in that requester’s understanding 
of religion. 
For example, although Welsh “originally characterized his beliefs 
as nonreligious, he later upon reflection wrote a long and thoughtful 
letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his beliefs were 
‘certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word.’”
53
 Similarly, in 
Adeyeye, the employee, in his two letters to Heartland requesting a 
leave of absence, did not clarify that his requests were based on his 
sincerely held religious beliefs.
54
 As in Welsh, the Seventh Circuit 
likewise did not require that Adeyeye explicitly include that his 




 Id. at 341-42 (“He explained: ‘I believe I mentioned taking of life as 
not being, for me, a religious wrong. Again, I assumed Mr. (Bradey, the 
Department of Justice hearing officer) was using the word ‘religious’ in the 
conventional sense, and, in order to be perfectly honest did not characterize 
my belief as ‘religious.’ App. 44.”). 
54
 See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th 
Cir. 2013).  
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particular requests were religious for the court to reach that 




F. The 1972 Amendments to Title VII 
 
The 1972 Amendment to Title VII addressed the disparity 
between preventing religious discrimination and requiring adherence 
to religious tolerance in the work place by incorporating “an 
affirmative duty of accommodation” into Title VII’s definition of 
religion.
56
 While “Congress had declared religious discrimination in 
employment unlawful” via Title VII, Congressional Representatives 
had not addressed an employer’s scope of duty with respect to 
religious accommodation under Title VII, and notably did not 
“indicate if an employer had an affirmative duty to accommodate 
employee religious practices.”
57
 Influenced by the 1967 EEOC 
Guidelines written in response to the Act, the United States Congress 
codified the change in the amended language of the 1967 EEOC 
Guidelines by enacting section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act in 
1972.
58
 “[B]y amending section 701 of Title VII in accordance with 
the 1967 Guidelines of the EEOC,” Congress attempted to resolve the 
disparity between the EEOC Guidelines and the contrasting holdings 
of some of the federal courts.
59
 This section defined “[t]he term 
‘religion’ [to] include[] all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrate[d] that he 
[was] unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 




 Kaminer, supra note 13, at 580. 
57
 Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 513-14. 
58
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); Kaminer, supra note 13, at 583-84. 
59
 Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 515; Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982); see 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63, 76 (1977); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1293 (1988). 
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 This language, embedded in the Act’s 
definition of religion, became the controlling language for federal 
courts’ analysis of religious accommodation in the workplace, and was 
consequently the standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in Adeyeye. 
“In effect, the definition of religious discrimination as contained in the 
amendment made it an unlawful employment practice under … Title 
VII for an employer not to reasonably accommodate, in the absence of 
undue hardship to the employer’s business, the religious practices of 
his employees.”
61
 This section was added in 1972 to illuminate the 
meaning of religious discrimination under the statute.
62
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in TWA v. Hardison, reluctantly 
noted, “like the EEOC Guidelines, the [1972 amendment to Title VII] 
provide[d] no guidance for determining the degree of accommodation 
that is required of an employer. The brief legislative history of § 701(j) 
is likewise of little assistance in this regard.”
63
 Ultimately, while the 
1972 amendment did follow the legislators’ intention to clarify and 
strengthen an employer’s obligation to accommodate religious 
requests, the Court found that the amended language of the statute had 
not provided an ultimate and final determination regarding the 
required degree of accommodation. In an important footnote, the TWA 
Court elaborated on the legislative history of section 701(j)’s 
definition of religion to accurately interpret the legislature’s intentions 
and full meaning of “religious accommodation.”
64
  
                                                 
60
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); Kaminer, supra note 13, at 583-84; see 
also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). 
According to the remarks of Sen. Randolph, Congress included the following 
definition of religion in its 1972 amendments to Title VII “[i]n part ‘to 
resolve by legislation’ some of the issues raised in Dewey.” 118 CONG. REC. 
706 (1972). 
61
 Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 515. 
62
 See generally id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
63
 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 
64
 Id. at 74 n. 9. 
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The Court explained that “[s]ection 701(j) was added to the 1972 
amendments on the floor of the Senate.”
65
 The TWA opinion continued 
by noting that the brief floor debate in the Senate regarding the 1972 
amendment’s definition of religion comprised the majority of section 
701(j)’s legislative history.
66
 That brief Senate floor debate consisted 
“principally of the views of the proponent of the measure, Senator 
Jennings Randolph.”
67
 “When Congress was reviewing Title VII in 
1972, Senator Jennings Randolph informed the Congress of these 
decisions,” improperly addressing unequal treatment of employees 
rather than the undue hardship of the employer, “which, he said, had 
‘clouded’ the meaning of religious discrimination. He introduced an 
amendment, tracking the language of the EEOC regulation, to make 
clear that Title VII requires religious accommodation, even though 
unequal treatment would result.”
68
 Left with limited guidance from the 
1972 Amendment to Title VII, to formulate the appropriate 
methodology, the Seventh Circuit borrowed its analysis of religious 












 Id.; 118 CONG. REC. 705-706 (1972). 
67
 118 CONG. REC. 705-706 (1972). Ultimately in TWA, the Supreme 
Court found “that TWA made reasonable efforts to accommodate” 
Hardison’s request for religious accommodation, “and that each of the Court 
of Appeals’ suggested alternatives would have been an undue hardship 
within the meaning of the statute as construed by the EEOC Guidelines.” 
TWA, 432 U.S. at 77. 
68
 TWA, 432 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 118 CONG. REC. 706 
(1972). 
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III. HEARTLAND’S REFUSAL TO ACCOMMODATE ADEYEYE’S REQUEST 
FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN HIS FATHER’S 
FUNERAL CEREMONIES AND RITUALS IN NIGERIA 
 
A. Summary of the Facts in Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC 
 
Sikiru Adeyeye was born in Nigeria and relocated to the United 
States in 2008.
69
 Sometime after his arrival in the U.S., Adeyeye began 
working for Heartland Sweeteners, LLC (“Heartland”), and was 
employed by Heartland from as late as July 2008 until October 2008.
70
 
Following the death of his father, Adeyeye “requested several weeks 
of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial 
rites.”
71
 In his two separate written requests to Heartland, written in 
July and September of 2010, Adeyeye asked Heartland for sufficient 
time off from work in order to travel to Nigeria to participate in his 
father’s funeral ceremonies.
72
 In those written requests Adeyeye 
stressed the significance of participating in his father’s funeral 
ceremonies. He indicated that his involvement “was ‘compulsory’ and 
that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members 
would suffer at least spiritual death.”
73
 “Adeyeye identified these 
religious rites in his letters requesting unpaid leave, quoted [below], as 
well as in his deposition and declaration. They included leading an 
extended procession through the village, animal sacrifice in the form 
of killing five goats, and cutting off his mother’s hair and anointing 
her head twice with snail oil while she remained secluded in her home 
for one month of mourning until Adeyeye coaxed her to exit her home 
and to reenter society.”
74
 Although Heartland denied Adeyeye’s 
                                                 
69
 Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
70
 Id. (“Adeyeye was born in Nigeria and lived there until he moved to 




 Id. at 450-51. 
73
 Id. at 447. 
74
 Id. at 452. 
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request for a leave of absence, he still chose to travel to Nigeria in 
order to participate in the funeral ceremonies for his father, and 
consequently, he did not appear for work during this absence. As a 
result of his leave of absence, Adeyeye was terminated by Heartland 




In the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of whether Adeyeye clearly 
communicated the religious nature of his request to his employers, the 
court looked to the letters that Adeyeye sent to Heartland regarding his 
request for a leave of absence.  His first written request, dated July 19, 
2010, stated: 
 
I hereby request for five weeks leave in order to attend 
funeral ceremony of my father. This is very important for me 
to be there in order to participate in the funeral rite according 
to our custom and tradition. The ceremony usually cover 
from three to four weeks and is two weeks after the burial, 
there is certain rite[s] that all of the children must participate. 
And after the third week, my mother will not come out until 
after one month when I have to be there to encourage her, and 
I have to [k]ill five goats, then she can now come out. This is 
done compulsory for the children so that the death will not 
come or take away any of the children's life. I will appreciate 




This request was denied, and Adeyeye submitted a second letter to 
Heartland on September 15, 2010, stating: 
 
I hereby request for my one week vacation and three weeks 
leave in order to attend the funeral ceremony of my father in 
my country, Nigeria—Africa, which is taking place by 
October next month. This is the second time I will inform you 
and request for this travelling trip from the company but no 
                                                 
75
 Id. at 447, 450-51. 
76
 Id. at 450. 
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reply to this matter. Nevertheless, the burial will be taking 
place by October next month and I have to be there and 
involved totally in this burial ceremony being the first child 
and the only son of the family. I therefore request for this 
period stated above for this trip and back to my work by 





In this second request, although Adeyeye “reduced his request 
from five weeks of unpaid leave to one week of (already earned) 
vacation and three weeks of unpaid leave,” his request for a leave of 
absence was again denied.
78
   
Adeyeye filed his lawsuit against Heartland under Title VII, 
claiming that Heartland failed to accommodate his request for a leave 
of absence prompted by his religious obligations surrounding the 
funeral ceremony for his father.
79
 The district court eventually granted 
Heartland’s motion for summary judgment, “finding that Adeyeye’s 
two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find that he had provided Heartland notice of the 
religious character of his request for unpaid leave.”
80
 Adeyeye 
appealed the district court’s granting of Heartland’s motion for 
summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit heard that appeal.  
 
B. The Holding from Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC 
 
Hon. David Frank Hamilton authored and wrote the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in this case, a unanimous decision. Hon. Diane S. 
Sykes and Hon. Joseph Peter Stadtmueller of the United States District 
Court, Eastern Wisconsin, sitting by designation, comprised the panel. 
The decision was made on July 31, 2013. The judgment of the district 
court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings 
                                                 
77




 Id. at 447. 
80
 Id.  
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consistent with the opinion. The Seventh Circuit held that Adeyeye’s 
lawsuit against Heartland should survive Heartland’s motion for 
summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether Adeyeye provided Heartland with sufficient notice 
of his need for a leave of absence and whether that leave of absence 
was requested based on Adeyeye’s own sincere religious beliefs.
81
 The 
court found that Adeyeye’s letters to Heartland requesting a leave of 
absence were “sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether Heartland had notice of the religious nature of the 
request.”
82
 Moreover, the court held that Adeyeye’s “discharge was a 
result of his religious observance” and that his particular religious 
accommodation of unpaid leave and vacation “would not have created 
an undue hardship on” Heartland.”
83
 Consequently, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed and remanded the opinion of the United States 




IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION AND 
INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER TITLE VII IN 
ADEYEYE 
 
A. Adeyeye Presented a Prima Facie Title VII Case 
 
Adeyeye satisfied the three-part test necessary to establish a prima 
facie case that Heartland failed to accommodate his religious 
observance.
85
 First, he demonstrated that he had a sincere or bona fide 
                                                 
81
 See generally id.  
82
 Id. at 447. 
83
 See generally id. 
84
 Id. at 447-48. 
85
 Kaminer, supra note 13, at 596-97; see Opuku-Boateng v. California, 
95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
797 F.2d 129, 133 (3rd Cir. 1986), Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 
1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987); see also 1 Fair Empl. Prac. § 8:69 (internal 
citations omitted). 
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religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment 
duty or job requirement.
86
 Second, he informed Heartland of his 
religious observance’s conflict with his work schedule via two 
separate written requests.
87
 Third and finally, Heartland “nevertheless 
enforced the job requirement against the employee, disciplined the 
employee for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement, or 
took other adverse employment action against the employee.”
88
 
To begin its analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that “Adeyeye’s 
claim for failure to accommodate his religion [was] straightforward,” 
noting that Adeyeye “assert[ed] that his request for unpaid leave was 
motivated by his own genuine, sincerely held religious beliefs that he 
had to perform his father’s burial rites.”
89
 The court recognized that 
Adeyeye “provided … Heartland ample notice that he sought unpaid 
leave for religious reasons. He then missed work to perform the burial 
rites and was fired because of this absence.”
90
 Importantly, “[o]nce the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of religious 
discrimination,” as Adeyeye did, “the burden then shifts to the 
employer to produce evidence showing that it cannot reasonably 
accommodate the worker without incurring undue hardship.”
91
 These 
facts supporting Adeyeye’s prima facie case ultimately supported the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision to reverse the district court’s grant of 
Heartland’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
B. The Definition and Interpretation of Religion  
 
Often the religiousness of the employee’s request for 
accommodation is straightforward and does not come into question. 
                                                 
86




 1 Fair Emp. Prac. § 8:69 (internal citations omitted). 
89
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 449. 
90
 Id.  
91
 Protos, 797 F.2d at 134; see also Smith, 827 F.2d at 1085; Opuku-
Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1468; Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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For example, an employee may request a change in work schedule due 
to his or her weekly Sabbath observance. In that instance, the 
religiousness of that employee’s request for accommodation is clear 
because the employee’s religion instructed the employee to refrain 
from working on the Sabbath. Where the religiousness of the 
employee’s request for accommodation is ambiguous, the EEOC has 
applied a broad definition of religion, and “define[d] religious 
practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and 
wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional 
religious views.”
92
 The equally accepting statutory definition of 




In Adeyeye, the court found that Title VII’s definition of religion 
encompassed three points.
94
 First, the statutory definition provided “a 
broad substantive definition of religion.”
95
 Second, the statute 
incorporated “an implied duty to accommodate employees’ 
religions.”
96
 Third and lastly, the statute contained “an explicit 
affirmative defense for failure-to-accommodate claims if the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.”
97
 
Each of those points contained within Title VII’s applicable and 
pertinent definition of “religion” will be addressed below.  
                                                 
92
 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious 
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (1975); see 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 (1965), rev’d on other grounds, 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), as stated in, United States ex 
rel. Foster v. Schlesinger, 520 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). 
93
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448. 
94
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (“The statutory definition of “religion” in 




 Id.  
97
 Id.  
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The Adeyeye court deconstructed the analysis of “whether a belief 
is in fact religious for purposes of Title VII” to three factors.
98
 First, 
the court asked whether the belief “must actually be religious.”
99
 
Second, the court investigated whether the “belief must be sincerely 
held.”
100
 Third, and lastly, the court looked to whether the 
accommodation of that belief “impose[d] an undue hardship on the 
employer.”
101
 The distinction between the analysis of religiousness 
and sincerity is an important one. In most cases, courts should not 
analyze religiousness, but it is permissible, and possibly necessary for 
courts to analyze sincerity. As laid out in Adeyeye, “proof of a sincere 
religious belief is the first element of the prima facie case that an 
employee must show in order to be successful under Title VII.”
102
  
Notably, courts are often wary of stepping outside of their proper 
judicial boundaries to analyze the religiousness of an employee’s 
request, and instead focus their evaluation on facts supporting or 
refuting that employee’s sincerity in his or her chosen religious 
tradition. While courts attempt to remain outside of the determination 
of the religiosity of an individual’s belief, courts “are willing to 
consider the sincerity of any purported belief.”
103
 Here, courts have 
found that “[p]roving the sincerity of one’s belief is part of 
establishing that one has a bona fide religious belief.”
104
 In analyzing 
                                                 
98
 Id.  
99
 Id.  
100
 Id.  
101
 Id. (citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n. 12 (7th 
Cir.1978)). 
102
 Likins, supra note 18, at 116-17; see Andrew M. Campbell, What 
Constitutes Employer’s Reasonable Accommodation of Employee’s Religious 
Preferences Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 134 A.L.R. FED. 26 
(1996). 
103
 Likins, supra note 18; see Susannah P. Mroz, True Believers?: 
Problems of Definition in Title VII Religious Discrimination Jurisprudence, 
39 IND. L. REV. 145, 156-67 (2005). 
104
 Likins, supra note 18; see Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, 279 
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sincerity, an employer may challenge an employee’s claim for 
religious accommodation by “demonstrating that the employee’s 




With the separation between analyzing religiousness and sincerity 
in mind, the Seventh Circuit noted in analyzing sincerity that the 
finder of fact should not evaluate that belief as being “orthodox or 
even mandated by an organized religious hierarchy.”
106
 This approach 
permits a variety of religious traditions to qualify as sincere under 
Title VII, whether those traditions comply with commonly held 
religious doctrine or are exclusive and particular to the employee 
whose request for accommodation is at issue. By acknowledging 
personal religious traditions alongside commonly accepted religious 
traditions, the Seventh Circuit signified its broader understanding of 
religion under Title VII. It progressed from the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Seeger and Welsh, where the various religious beliefs at 
issue were directly compared to a belief in God or a supreme being. 
With the proper analysis, the sincerity of the belief is based on that 
individual’s inner convictions rather than established religious 
traditions or commonly held beliefs. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit 
found that “[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs 
because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position or 
because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision 
that a more sophisticated person might employ.”
107
  
The Adeyeye court applied a broad analysis of an employee’s 
sincere religious belief by holding that the belief’s consistency with or 
                                                                                                                   
F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002); Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 
591, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
105
 Likins, supra note 18; see Peter M. Panken, Religion and the 
Workplace: Harmonizing Work and Worship 2, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF 
STUDY MATERIALS, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 4 
n.10 (2005). 
106
 Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 452 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
107
 Id. at 452-53; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. 
Division, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). 
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adherence to any predetermined orthodoxy or established religious 
tradition need not be a determining factor in the sincerity of that 
belief.
108
 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that an individual’s 
belief need not be perfectly consistent “in observance, practice, and 
interpretation” with his or her own religious observances, practices 
and interpretations “when determining if a belief system qualifies as a 
religion or whether a person’s belief is sincere.”
109
 The court found 
that a broader interpretation of sincere religious beliefs permitted a 
flexible understanding of any person’s religious traditions, 
observances or practices.
110
 In addition, this approach prevented courts 
from interfering in an ultimately impracticable and futile analysis of 
whether an individual’s beliefs adhere to their own practices, or the 
established practices of any one religious tradition.
111
 
Less common religious observances and practices, such as the 
Nigerian funeral traditions at issue in Adeyeye, compelled the court to 
apply a broader understanding of those religious traditions in order to 
apply the Act evenly to all requests for religious accommodation 
rooted in sincere religious beliefs. “The Act protects not only orthodox 
religious beliefs, observances, and practices, but also those which are 
unorthodox and which might be characterized by most persons as 
mistaken or incomprehensible.”
112
 In order to properly analyze the 
sincerity of less common religious beliefs, courts must construe 
                                                 
108




 Id. (stating “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”) 
(citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division, 450 
U.S. at 716); see also Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454–55 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“[A] sincere religious believer doesn't forfeit his religious rights 
merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for where would 
religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”). 
111
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 453. 
112
 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious 
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (1975). 
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religion and religious beliefs more broadly.
113
 The court in Adeyeye 
found that “a genuinely held belief that involves matters of the 
afterlife, spirituality, or the soul, among other possibilities, qualifies as 
religion under Title VII.”
114
 The court recognized that while “the 
religious beliefs and practices Adeyeye referred to are not as familiar 
as beliefs and practices closer to the modern American mainstream[,] 
… the protections of Title VII are not limited to familiar religions.”
115
  
In order for Adeyeye’s claim to survive summary judgment, 
Adeyeye had to show that his religious beliefs were religious in his 
“own scheme of things” and that this religious belief was “sincerely 
held.”
116
 The court concluded that Adeyeye presented sufficient 
evidence “to show that Adeyeye’s religious request to attend his 
father’s funeral in Nigeria so that he could perform specific rites, 
traditions, and customs was borne from his own personally and 
sincerely held religious beliefs.”
117
 Adeyeye explained in his 
deposition testimony and declaration that his “family’s religion is a 
blend of Christianity and customs, traditions, and ceremonial rites 
developed in his Nigerian village.”
118
 A significant aspect of 
Adeyeye’s religion is that “the specific dictates of [his] family’s 
                                                 
113
 Kramer, supra note 112. 
114
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448; see Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 
678, 681 (7th Cir.2005) (“[W]hen a person sincerely holds beliefs dealing 
with issues of ultimate concern that for her occupy a place parallel to that 
filled by God in traditionally religious persons, those beliefs represent her 
religion.”) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted). 
115
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451; see Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 
897, 900-01 (7th Cir. 1978) (Title VII protects conduct that is “religiously 
motivated” and includes “all forms and aspects of religion, however 
eccentric”) (quoting Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168 (5th 
Cir.1976)). 
116
 Redmond, 574 F.2d at 901 n. 12 (internal quotations omitted); see 
also Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451. 
117
 Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451-52 (“That is to say, a jury could find that 
for Adeyeye to observe his religion appropriately, it was necessary for him to 
participate in the burial ceremonies.”). 
118
 Id. at 452. 
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religious practice[s] are identified, determined, and required by [his] 
father.” Therefore, Adeyeye has incorporated his father’s “rites and 
traditions” as a necessary element of his own religious practices and 
observances.
119
 Adeyeye clarified his simultaneous practice and belief 
in both his Christian and Nigerian religious traditions, stating: 
 
The Christian religion in which [he] was raised incorporates 
the traditional rites and customs of my village and family. 
Under these traditions, my father, as the head of the family, 
determined the religious practices, beliefs and customs for his 
household. I believe that I was spiritually compelled to follow 
these practices, beliefs, and customs in connection with the 




The court explained this as “an inter-generational form of faith and 
practice where part of the belief system is that the head of each 




Adeyeye clarified that his Christian and Nigerian religious 
traditions were interconnected. Those simultaneous traditions 
established his identity as a Christian and provided a sincere religious 
belief in the Nigerian traditions surrounding his father’s funeral, as 
well as his devout need to participate in that ceremony. Adeyeye 
stressed the sincerity of his request by explaining “the spiritual 
consequences of his failure to carry out his father's burial rites.”
122
 He 
asserted that he “was compelled by [his] religious beliefs to follow the 
traditional rites and customs established by [his] father as head of the 
                                                 
119
 Id. (“Adeyeye explained this in his deposition: ‘I have to go to 
Nigeria to go to perform my rites. Being my rites—what I mean by rite, we 
have a customary rite, our whole culture. So being the main child of the 
family, so I have to go there and perform a rite.’”). 
120
 Id. at 453. 
121
 Id.  
122
 Id. at 451-52.  
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household in connection with [his] father’s death and funeral.”
123
 In 
addition, he stated that “if [he] failed to follow these rites, [his] 
father’s death would have brought spiritual death upon both [his] 
mother and [him]self and would have prevented [he and his] mother 
… from finding spiritual peace.”
124
 The Seventh Circuit recognized 
that these statements showed that Adeyeye’s request to travel to 
Nigeria for his father’s funeral was deeply rooted in his own religious 
traditions and sincere religious beliefs. 
Describing his role in the traditional Nigerian funeral practices in 
further detail, “Adeyeye explained that as the first son, he was 
required both to cut his mother’s hair and to ensure that she exited her 
home a month later ‘so that she will not be disgraced … and the death 
will not come upon her.’”
 125
 According to Adeyeye’s religious beliefs, 
if he did not participate in his father’s funeral ceremony, the spirits of 
his deceased ancestors would lie, as heavy spiritual weight, on 
himself, his siblings, and his mother.
126
 Adeyeye, his siblings and his 
mother needed to perform the necessary traditional Nigerian funeral 
rites “to avoid disgrace and to avoid the [spiritual] death of [his] 
mother[;] … his attendance was mandatory ‘so that the death will not 
come or take away any of the children's life.’”
127
 
The Adeyeye opinion includes a particular instruction from the 
Bible, to “honor thy father and thy mother.”
128
 In full, this verse, in the 
book of Exodus, reads, “Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy 
days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth 
thee.”
129
 Alternatively, in the book of Deutoronomy, this verse states, 
“Honour thy father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath 
commanded thee; that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go 
                                                 
123
 Id. at 453-54. 
124
 Id. at 454. 
125
 Id. at 454 n. 3.  
126
 Id.  
127
 Id.  
128
 Id. at 454. 
129
 Exodus 20:12 (King James).  
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well with thee, in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”
130
 The 
Seventh Circuit’s inclusion of this Bible verse is particularly pertinent 
to Adeyeye’s request for religious accommodation. The passage 
highlights both the purpose of Adeyeye’s request to Heartland—to 
honor his father by participating in the traditional Nigerian funeral 
ceremonies—as well as Adeyeye’s simultaneous observance of both 
his Christian religion and traditional Nigerian customs.  
The teaching from the Bible, to honor thy father and thy mother, 
represents Adeyeye’s simultaneous adherence to two religious 
traditions. By participating in his father’s funeral ceremony with his 
mother, Adeyeye acted in accordance with his Nigerian traditions, and, 
in doing so, recognized his Christianity by honoring his father and 
mother. Heartland, as well as the district court, found that Adeyeye’s 
request to participate in the Nigerian traditions of his father’s funeral 
was not sufficiently connected to Adeyeye’s personal and sincere 
Christian beliefs to warrant religious accommodation. By highlighting 
the phrase “honor thy father and thy mother” in the Adeyeye opinion, 
the Seventh Circuit emphasized that a genuine issue of material fact 
remained as to whether Adeyeye held sincere religious beliefs with 
respect to both Nigerian and Christian traditions. That particular lesson 
from the Bible elucidated the harmony and sincerity of Adeyeye’s 
Nigerian and Christian religious traditions. Moreover, by finding that 
Adeyeye’s request for accommodation may have been reasonable and 
did not impose an undue hardship on Heartland, the Seventh Circuit 
incorporated this broad and accepting understanding of diverse and 
unique, but still sincere, religious beliefs into their overall analysis of 
religious accommodation. 
 
C. The Definition and Interpretation of Religious Accommodation 
 
Some legal commentators have determined that even after Title 
VII’s amendment in 1972, Congress failed to resolve “the definition of 
reasonable accommodation as that term is used in section 701(j) and 
                                                 
130
 Deuteronomy 5:16 (King James).  
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relates to section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.”
131
 While the 1972 
amendment may have failed to elaborate on the meaning of Title VII, 
importantly, “the amendment [does clarify] that an employer has an 
affirmative obligation to act.”
132
 However, “[t]he amendment offers no 
guidance regarding the extent of the effort required, i.e., guidance with 
respect to what effort is a reasonable effort.”
133
 The 1972 Amendment 
to Title VII made clear that an employer’s reasonable accommodation 
to an employee’s religious request was an affirmative duty, but the 
amendment did not prescribe any standards for what that reasonable 
accommodation might entail. 
Generally, federal courts have interpreted the reasonable effort of 
an employer’s accommodation to be a minimal effort.
134
 This 
application of a minimal accommodation standard may be due to the 
influence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Hardison (“TWA”), where the court “narrowly interpreted an 
employer’s obligation to accommodate a religious employee” when it 
“addressed the scope of § 701(j).”
135
 A close analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s narrow interpretations of religious accommodation in TWA, in 
contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation in Adeyeye, 
emphasizes courts’ progression towards greater freedom of religious 







                                                 
131




 Id.  
134
 Kaminer, supra note 13, at 577 (“The lower courts have, for the most 
part, interpreted § 701(j) as requiring only a minimal level of 
accommodation of religious employees.”). 
135
 Id.  
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1. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Religious Accommodation 
Under Title VII in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, (1977) 
 
In TWA, the employee requested that his employer not schedule 
him to work on Saturdays, his religion’s Sabbath.
136
 Ultimately, “no 
accommodation could be reached, and [the employee] was discharged 
for refusing to work on Saturdays.”
137
 In response to his termination, 
the employee “brought an action for injunctive relief against TWA … 
claiming that his discharge constituted religious discrimination in 
violation of s 703(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee on the basis of his religion.”
138
  
The Supreme Court clearly stated that “[t]he issue in [TWA was] 
the extent of the employer’s obligation under Title VII to 
accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs prohibit him from 
working on Saturdays.”
139
 The employee’s “claim of religious 
discrimination was based on the 1967 [EEOC] Guidelines in effect at 
the time requiring an employer, short of ‘undue hardship,’ to make 
‘reasonable accommodations’ to the religious needs of its employees, 
and on similar language in the 1972 amendments to Title VII.”
140
 The 
                                                 
136





 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 63 (1977) (“Hardison, having first invoked the administrative 
remedy provided by Title VII, brought this action for injunctive relief in the 
United States District Court against TWA … claiming that his discharge by 
TWA constituted religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.”). 
139
 TWA, 432 U.S. at 66. 
140
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1970 ed., Supp. V); 29 CFR § 1605.1 (1968); 
TWA, 432 U.S. at 63-64. Initially, employee plaintiff “invoked the 
administrative remedy provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.” “Hardison’s claim of religious discrimination rested on 1967 EEOC 
Guidelines requiring employers ‘to make reasonable accommodations to the 
religious needs of employees’ whenever such accommodation would not 
32
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Court ultimately held that “it would be anomalous to conclude that by 
‘reasonable accommodations’ Congress meant that an employer must 
deny the shift and job preferences of some employees, as well as 
deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or 
prefer the religious needs of others.”
141
 The TWA Court stated that 
Title VII “makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to discriminate against an employee or a prospective employee on the 
basis of his or her religion.”
142
 The Court took note of the EEOC’s 
Guidelines requiring “that an employer, short of ‘undue hardship,’ 
make ‘reasonable accommodations’ to the religious needs of its 
employees.”
143
 The Court also recognized that the Act had adopted the 
language of those EEOC Guidelines.
144
 
With this holding, the Court essentially applied an outdated 
standard of religious accommodation. This standard improperly 
focused on an employer’s efforts on maintaining equal employment 
standards for all employees, regardless of their religion.
145
 This 
holding was in stark contrast to the appropriate standard emphasized in 
the later EEOC Guidelines and amendments to Title VII. That proper 
standard permitted the unequal treatment of employees in order to 
reasonably accommodate certain employees’ religious practices. The 
TWA Court erred by ignoring the EEOC Guidelines and instead 
applying this outdated interpretation of religious accommodation 
under Title VII. 
The Court found that “Title VII does not contemplate [the] 
unequal treatment” of employees that may result from a particular 
                                                                                                                   
work an ‘undue hardship,’ and on similar language adopted by Congress in 
the 1972 amendments to Title VII.”  
141
 TWA, 432 U.S. at 64. 
142
 Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 78 Stat. 
255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); TWA, 432 U.S. at 66. 
143
 29 CFR § 1605.1(b) (1968); TWA, 432 U.S. at 66. 
144
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1970 ed., Supp. V); TWA, 432 U.S. at 66. 
145
 TWA, 432 U.S. at 64. (“Title VII does not require an employer to go 
that far. Pp. 2274-2275.”). 
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employee’s request for religious accommodation.
146
 It emphasized that 
their interpretation and application of Title VII to prevent unequal 
treatment aimed to eliminate employment discrimination “when it is 
directed against majorities as well as minorities.”
147
 In doing so, the 
Court concluded that if TWA reasonably accommodated one 
employee’s request for a weekly Sabbath observance, they would 
accordingly “deny the shift and job preference of some employees … 
in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.”
148
 
The Court found that this denial of scheduling preferences to some 
employees to accommodate the religious request of another employee 
was not reasonable, and instead qualified as an undue hardship on the 
employer, finding that “Title VII does not require an employer to go 
that far.”
149
 In contrast to the Court’s narrow reading of Title VII in 
TWA, later interpretations of religious accommodation, such as the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Adeyeye, appropriately incorporated both 
the EEOC Guidelines and the 1972 amendment to reach a broader 
understanding of religious accommodation that complies with the 
statute as well as the First Amendment. 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the 
majority’s opinion in TWA.
150
 Their dissent promotes a broad 
interpretation of religious accommodation under Title VII, evidently 
placing an affirmative duty on employers to accommodate employees’ 
religious requests. Justice Marshall’s methodology is aligned with the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach in Adeyeye, rather that the Supreme 
Court’s approach in TWA.  
Justice Marshall noted that difficulties with religious 
accommodation and discrimination under Title VII often arise with 
regard to “adherents to minority faiths who do not observe the holy 
days on which most businesses are closed,” and instead “need time off 
                                                 
146




 Id.  
149
 Id.  
150
 Id. at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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for their own days of religious observance.”
151
 Marshall’s approach to 
minority religions is particularly relevant in TWA, as well as in 
Adeyeye. Justice Marshall accurately concluded that religious 
accommodation resulting in certain unequal treatment is acceptable 
under Title VII, and should even be expected in cases regarding the 
accommodation of a minority religion. Justice Marshall explained that 
where an “employee is to be exempt” from a particular work schedule, 
that exemption “will always result in a privilege being ‘allocated 
according to religious beliefs,’” unless the employer permits that 
exemption for their entire staff.
152
 For example, closing a business on 
Sunday may accommodate the religious needs of many Christians who 
observe their Sabbath. However, adherents to those minority religions 
who observe their Sabbath on a day of the week other than Sunday, a 
tradition that affects some sects of Christianity, are left without 
appropriate religious accommodations for observing their Sabbath.  
Justice Marshall consequently found that “if an accommodation 
can be rejected simply because it involves preferential treatment, then 
the regulation and the statute, while brimming with ‘sound and fury,’ 
ultimately ‘signif[y] nothing.’”
153
 In this fashion, Justice Marshall 
found that religious accommodation, especially for minority religions, 
would inevitably lead to some unequal treatment amongst employees. 
He further noted that this unequal treatment was not prohibited by 
Title VII, and in fact may be necessary to reasonably accommodate 
religious requests and to preserve religious freedom without imposing 
undue hardship on the employer. The appropriate standard is not 
whether the religious accommodation causes unequal treatment 
amongst the employees, but whether the religious accommodation 








 Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
153
 Id. at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
154
 Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In each instance, the question is 
whether the statute says, in plain words, … that such allocations are required 
unless ‘undue hardship’ would result.”). 
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2. Religious Accommodation in Adeyeye  
 
To begin its analysis of Adeyeye’s request for religious 
accommodation from Heartland, the Seventh Circuit applied the three-
part analysis it previously utilized in Porter v. City of Chicago.
155
 In 
Porter, the Seventh Circuit found that an employee must prove three 
things in order to present a sufficient claim that the employer failed to 
accommodate that employee’s religious request.
156
 First, the employee 
must show that “the observance or practice conflicting with an 
employment requirement is religious in nature.”
157
 Second, the 
employee must have “called the religious observance or practice to 
[the] employer’s attention.”
158
 And third, “the religious observance or 
practice [must be] the basis for [the employee’s] discharge or other 
discriminatory treatment.”
159
 As discussed below, Adeyeye clearly 
satisfied all three of these requirements. 
 
D. The Interpretation of Undue Hardship 
 
Under Title VII, an employer is not obligated to accommodate any 
and all of an employee’s requests for religious accommodation. 
Instead, Title VII permits an employer to deny an employee’s request 
for religious accommodation if that employer can show that 
accommodating the request would impose an undue hardship on the 
employer. Without this balance in Title VII, religious accommodation 
would present a tremendous roadblock to otherwise functioning 
businesses. Moreover, it is not unfair or unconstitutional for an 
employer to deny the accommodation of an employee’s religious 
                                                 
155
 Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir.2012) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 
F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2013). 
156
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request where that employee’s religious needs impose a substantial 
burden or undue hardship on the employer.  
 
1. The Demonstration of Actual Undue Hardship is Necessary 
 
In the analysis of undue hardship under Title VII, an employer 
must present evidence that the employer’s accommodation of the 
employee’s religious request would cause, or has caused, an actual 
undue hardship on the employer. Only after a showing of actual undue 
hardship may an employer be exempt from complying with the 
employee’s request for religious accommodation.
160
  
There are a number of factors that may influence a court’s 
analysis of whether an employee’s request for religious 
accommodation presents actual undue hardship to an employer. Some 
of those factors include: (1) violation of the “seniority provision of a 
valid collective bargaining agreement”; (2) “suffering more than 
minimal costs in terms of money or efficiency in attempting to replace 
the absent worker”; or (3) “requiring employees of other religions or 
nonreligious employees to work at times that are undesirable to them 
in place of a worker who is absent because of a religious conflict with 
work hours.”
161
 The costs of covering or replacing an absent worker 
were particularly relevant to Heartland’s claim of undue hardship in 
Adeyeye.  
                                                 
160
 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious 
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (1975) 
(commentators noted that “[a] refusal to accommodate is justified only when 
an employer … can demonstrate that an undue hardship would in fact result 
from each available alternative method of accommodation.”). 
161
 1 Fair Empl. Prac. § 8:69; Collective Bargaining Agreement: 
E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 102 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961, 90 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43094 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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The court in Adeyeye analyzed Heartland’s potential undue 
hardship based on Adeyeye’s specific position at Heartland.
162
 While 
employed at Heartland, Adeyeye was a material handler and a 
packer/palletizer.
163
 Significantly, the court noted, “that Heartland 
expects and plans for high turnover of workers in both job categories 
without compromising quality or productivity.”
164
 Due to Heartland’s 
expectation of high turnover, Heartland could not meet the undue 
hardship standard under Title VII. Because temporary workers could 
readily replace Adeyeye’s position, Heartland was unable to show that 
Adeyeye’s absence would inconvenience them to the level of undue 
hardship.
165
 The Seventh Circuit consequently found that Heartland 
did not present evidence showing that “any reasonable jury would 
have to find that permitting Adeyeye to take three weeks of unpaid 
leave in conjunction with his week of vacation would have created an 




2. Heartland Sweeteners Was Unable to Show any Undue Hardship as 
a Result of Adeyeye’s Request for Religious Accommodation 
 
The Seventh Circuit noted that once Adeyeye has established his 
prima facie case for religious accommodation, “the burden then shifts 
to [Heartland,] to show that it could not accommodate the employee’s 
religious belief or practice without causing the employer undue 
hardship.”
167
 In Adeyeye’s second written request for religious 
                                                 
162







 Id. (“Heartland expected and planned for the frequent turnover of 
employees by keeping a ready list of temporary workers who usually 
reported to Heartland within an hour of a request.” In addition, the court 
found that “Title VII requires proof not of minor inconveniences but of 




 Id. at 449 (citing Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir.1986)). 
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accommodation, he presented Heartland with a suggestion to 
accommodate his leave of absence, proposing that he may “take his 
one week of vacation together with three weeks unpaid leave to allow 
enough time to travel to Nigeria and participate in the burial rites.”
168
 
Importantly, the Adeyeye Court’s analysis of undue hardship found that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has recognized unpaid leave as a reasonable and 





VI. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII IS THE 
APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION  
 
The Seventh Circuit, by finding that Adeyeye had a claim for 
religious accommodation that was sufficient to survive Heartland’s 
motion for summary judgment, properly interpreted religious 
accommodation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of 
Title VII in Adeyeye appropriately accentuated an accepting approach 
to lesser-known minority religious traditions and a broad application 
of an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s 
religious request. This implementation of Title VII aptly followed the 
amendments to Title VII as well as the EEOC Guidelines. In doing so, 
the Seventh Circuit’s conclusions in Adeyeye were in congruence with 
the trend towards greater religious acceptance and understanding as 
reflected in the statutory language of Title VII and the evolution of the 
EEOC guidelines regarding religious accommodation. Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit’s broad understanding of religious accommodation in 
                                                 
168
 Id. at 455. 
169
 Id. (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70-71 
(1986) (internal quotations omitted) (“The provision of unpaid leave 
eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious 
practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and 
requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact 
work. Generally speaking, the direct effect of unpaid leave is merely a loss of 
income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no 
direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.”). 
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Adeyeye promotes religious freedom in accordance with the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
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